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Abstract: As inflation rates in the United States decline, analysts are asking if there are
economic reasons to hold the rates at levels above zero. Previous studies of whether
inflation “greases the wheels” of the labor market ignore inflation’s potential for
disrupting wage patterns in the same market. This paper outlines an institutionally-based
model of wage-setting that allows the benefits of inflation (downward wage flexibility) to
be separated from disruptive uncertainty about inflation rate (undue variation in relative
prices). Our estimates, using a unique 40-year panel of wage changes made by large mid-
western employers, suggest that low rates of inflation do help the economy to adjust to
changes in labor supply and demand.  However, when inflation's disruptive effects are
balanced against this benefit the labor market justification for pursuing a positive long-
term inflation goal effectively disappears.
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“Higher prices or faster inflation can diminish involuntary, disequilibrium
unemployment...The economy is in perpetual...disequilibrium even when it has settled into
a stochastic macro-equilibrium...[When wages are rigid downward] price inflation...is a
neutral method of making arbitrary money wage paths conform to the realities of
productivity growth.”
James Tobin, ‘Inflation and Unemployment,’ AEA Presidential Address (1972).
“[Higher, more variable inflation causes:  a] reduction in the capacity of the price
system to guide economic activity;  distortions in relative prices because of the
introduction of greater friction, as it were, in all markets;  and very likely, a higher
recorded rate of unemployment.”
Milton Friedman, ‘Inflation and Unemployment,’ Nobel Lecture (1977).
Who is right?  The question is particularly relevant now, because of widespread
reductions in core inflation and the growing use of explicit inflation targets by central
banks.  Is the most economically efficient level of price changes zero (as Friedman argues)
or somewhere above that (as per Tobin)?  This debate centers on the labor market,
because labor accounts for two-thirds of production costs and its prices are thought to be
stickier (particularly downward) than goods prices.
Tobin’s argument has been called the “grease” effect: a certain amount of inflation
benefits economic performance in the labor market by allowing greater wage flexibility.
Maintaining the metaphor of the economy as a geared machine, we refer to Friedman’s
description of inflation as “sand,” because it interferes with transmission of price signals,
disrupting the smooth operation of the economy.
Were monetary policy-makers to adopt an inflation target, the appropriate goal
would hinge on whether inflation adds beneficial grease or grating sand.  We find that the
key to distinguishing between the Tobin and Friedman arguments is to place them in the
context of the relevant labor market institutions.  A simple model of labor markets
consistent with these institutions suggests an empirical strategy for identifying and
contrasting “grease” and “sand.”  Applying this technique to unique data over a forty-one-
year period we find that inflation’s net benefits in the labor market are, in fact, very small
and are exhausted at consumer price index rates above 2.5 to 3 percent.  We conclude that3
the labor market provides little guidance on an optimal long-run inflation goal and, in
particular, does not appear to justify maintaining ongoing inflation goals of above 2.5
percent.
Inflation’s Costs and Benefits in the Labor Market – Institutional Perspective
Inflation affects labor market efficiency by influencing firms’ wage-setting
practices and compensation schemes.  In economies with competitive labor, capital, and
product markets, comparable workers at equivalent jobs should be compensated similarly.
1
If an employer sets wages too low, employee morale and productivity may suffer, and
turnover may rise—all resulting in lower profits.  However, if an employer pays too much,
it will also experience lower profits or have to lay off workers because it will be unable to
price products competitively and still be profitable.  Thus, any factor that interferes with
firms’ accurate wage setting can raise unemployment, worker turnover, or company
failures.
How Inflation Impairs Economic Efficiency: The Sand Effect.  Inflation can
cause firms throughout the labor market to make miscalculations in wage setting.  This
interference—the sand effect—occurs in the first stage of the two-stage annual wage-
setting process, when an employer’s senior management sets the average wage change for
its work force.  The average wage change selected reflects inflation forecasts, labor
market surveys, and projections of sales and product prices.
2  Management aims to
maintain the company’s profitability by not over- or underpaying employees to prevent
both excessively high labor costs and unwanted turnover.  Many employers pursue this
goal by maintaining some ongoing desired parity with other employers.
Despite this planning, inflation forecasts can cause employers’ salary budgets to
differ in unintended ways.  This happens partly because the coming year’s inflation is never
                                               
1 Compensation includes wages, benefits, and working conditions.  For simplicity, we focus on
wages in this analysis.  Wages are the largest and most flexible part of compensation and are most subject
to the effects of inflation.
2 In a unionized company, wage determination also involves negotiation with union leaders and
a long (usually three-year) time horizon.4
known in advance.  Typically, the higher the inflation level, the less certain employers are
about current and future rates.  Thus, high inflation results in uneven wage changes among
firms, as each relies on its own set of information.  Even without this uncertainty, high and
fluctuating inflation raises the dispersion of wage changes because different firms adjust
wages in different months and some face cash or other constraints that temporarily prevent
them from adjusting fully.  Therefore, wage mistakes caused by differing perceptions of
the state of the economy under high inflation can misdirect resources from their most
productive uses.
How Inflation Overcomes Wage Rigidity: The Grease Effect.  Despite its
negative effects, inflation does allow firms to reduce some workers’ pay without cutting
their dollar wages.  This flexibility benefit—the grease effect—is conferred at the second
stage of the wage-setting process, because it helps employers overcome an important
impediment to accurate wage setting.
Each corporate division of an employer allocates its share of the salary budget
among its workers to match market wages and reward performance.  However, the
divisions face two constraints.  The first is financial—they cannot overspend their budget.
The second is the prevalent social (or bureaucratic) norm that discourages employers from
cutting the wages of good workers who face unfavorable labor market conditions -- even
when inflation is low.  The two main reasons offered for this “downward wage rigidity”
are either personnel practices designed to promote fairness or strong worker resistance to
wage cuts—stemming from money illusion (that is, workers resist cuts in their dollar
earnings more than they resist equivalent rises in the prices of what they buy) or the
importance of mortgage, car loan, and other fixed-dollar payments in peoples’ expenses.
Yet employers often need to reconfigure wage differences among occupations in
their divisions to respond to external influences.  In a competitive labor market, an
occupation’s wages reflect the amount and kind of training necessary, working conditions,
and whether such workers are in short supply compared to firms’ need for them.  These
circumstances can change, as technology, products, demographics, or input prices shift.5
Corresponding wage changes influence people’s job-search and training decisions toward
occupations in high demand and away from those with too many workers.
As inflation frees employers from wage rigidity, it lends corporate divisions more
flexibility to match market wages.
3  As other prices rise, employers can effectively lower
wages that need to fall even without imposing nominal pay cuts.  Inflation, thus, helps to
prevent overpayment of those workers in occupations with falling relative wages,
eliminating the need for more unpleasant alternatives.  With this grease in place, wage
signals travel more rapidly through the economy, reducing layoffs and providing more
accurate incentives to workers choosing occupational training and career paths.
Formalizing the Labor Market Model
The effects described above can be incorporated into a formal model that yields
testable hypotheses about grease and sand.  Such a model must be consistent with the
following common corporate wage adjustment practices:
1. Firms look to other firms to ensure that their wages are in line with those of
their labor and product market competitors.
2. Firms use observed wage patterns in other firms to adjust relative wages for
their occupations.
3. Maintaining these market parities is considered critical to maintaining an
effective workforce.
These characteristics can be incorporated into a generalization of the Sparks
(1986) efficiency wage model.
4  In addition, this model has the desirable feature of
allowing persistent unemployment.
The Sparks (1986) model rests on three key assumptions: employees’ disutility of
working rises with their effort on the job, an efficiency-wage firm’s output depends
                                               
3 Similarly, in a union setting, higher average wage gains make it more likely that the union
will accept differential gains between types of workers.
4 Sparks (1986) is itself a generalization of efficiency wage models of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984).6
critically on the effort expended by their workforce, and efficiency-wage employers
evaluate their workers’ effort imperfectly.  We extend the model by adding two features:
(1) workers are classified into occupations that represent specific production skills and
experience independent shocks, and (2) a spot-market sector of employers competes with
efficiency-wage firms for labor, but not in the product market (because they produce a
complementary good).  Groshen and Schweitzer (1998) details the further assumptions
and specifics of our model.
The model is consistent with the three wage adjustment practices listed above and
yields important testable conclusions.  We start with predictions about the grease effect
and then continue with the sand effect.
In our model, nominal wage rigidity comes from some inflection of worker
preferences at the zero nominal wage change—that is, workers may experience a discrete
rise in the disutility of their effort after nominal wage cuts.  This story is consistent with
prevalence of nominally-priced contracts in the U.S. economy.  If firms do avoid nominal
wage cuts, the workers most affected are those whose occupation gets a negative shock,
no matter what type of firm they are in.
5  Thus, most of the effect of downward rigidity
will occur across firms—as all firms that employ an affected occupation respond to the
relative productivity shock.  This observation provides a way to judge the prevalence of
downward nominal wage rigidities in an economy: measure the scope and limits of
occupation wage adjustments in relation to the level of inflation.  As the inflation rate
rises, the same relative productivity shocks will cause fewer and fewer workers to face
possible nominal wage cuts.  So, in an economy with downward rigidity, the variance of
occupational wage changes rises with the level of inflation—up until the rigidity no longer
binds.
Turning to the sand effect, the model shows that each firm’s inflation outlook
appears in its wage adjustments.  Any employer’s mistakes in projecting product price
                                               
5 Note that, while firms that expect poor (or negative) price growth are potentially constrained,
the impact of the constraint will be strongest for the occupations with lowest wage growth in the economy
as a whole.7
growth shows up uniformly in the wages of all its workers.  Because this information on
the firm’s expectations appears in each wage, averaging over all workers yields the best
estimate of this factor in wage adjustments.  Furthermore, because firms try to maintain
their positions relative to alternative employers, the average wage change across all firms
provides a good estimate of what a firm would have preferred to offer (ex-post) as an
average or baseline adjustment.  Thus, the sand effect predicts a positive relationship
between inflation and the variance of firms’ mean wage adjustments.
Finally, the model allows us to estimate the cost (in terms of profits) to the firm for
the two effects.  A Taylor-series approximation of the firm’s profit levels at wage rates
near but not at the optimum shows that the firms costs for either wage adjustment failure
depend on the size of the discrepancy not it’s source.  The key term being the squared
difference between the optimal and the realized wage.  Empirically, Friedman and Tobin’s
effects of inflation on the labor market can be summarized and compared using the
standard deviations of wage adjustments, once certain controls have been implemented.
Estimates of Inflation’s Effects in the Labor Market
How important are these grease and sand effects?  On the negative side, since
inflation causes mistakes in firms’ salary budgets (sand), we can measure sand by
identifying how much inflation raises wage-change disagreement among employers.  On
the positive side, since inflation frees employers from wage rigidity, we can measure
grease by the degree to which inflation allows occupations to have different wage
changes.
6
Grease Effect Estimates.  Chart 1 shows an empirical measure of the grease and
sand effects of inflation in the labor market, taken from our earlier studies of the effects of
inflation in a unique forty-one-year data set of firm-level wage changes (Groshen and
Schweitzer 1997, 1998).  Despite substantial differences in approaches, our results are
                                               
6 A wide range of tests supports the validity of this identification strategy.  See Groshen and
Schweitzer (1997) for a full description of the tests of this identification strategy.8
consistent with those of other studies that have found a beneficial grease effect.
7  We find
that the labor market benefits of inflation increase most rapidly at the lowest inflation rates
and peak at about 7.5 percent (the positive vertical axis), allowing for 1.5 percent
productivity growth (about the average over the forty-one years examined).
8
Policymakers, however, would be unlikely to set inflation goals simply by looking
for the maximum on a curve such as the one shown in Chart 1.  To see why, note how the
grease curve levels off as it nears the peak.  That is, inflation rates of 4 to 5 percent deliver
most of the benefits of a 7.5 percent rate.  Thus, a conservative approach, implicitly
recognizing that inflation has some undesirable effects, would dictate choosing an inflation
goal in the range of 4 to 5 percent.  Interestingly, despite important differences in
approach, our results qualitatively confirm previous studies’ conclusions that the beneficial
grease effect exists and operates most strongly at inflation rates below 4 percent.
Sand Effect Estimates.  Unlike other studies on grease effects, we also estimate
the substantial role played by inflation’s sand effects in the labor market: measured as the
extent to which inflation raises the disagreement among employers about their average
wage changes (adjusted for the skills they employ).  Because this inflation-induced sand is
detrimental to the labor market, we plot it on the negative vertical axis in Chart 1.
On the basis of sand effects in the labor market alone, the preferred inflation goal is
clearly zero.  For inflation rates up to 13 percent (where we have recent experience), we
find that disruptive sand effects grow continually as inflation rises.  The disruption
increases most rapidly at the lowest inflation rates.  However, at least until inflation levels
of 13 percent, more inflation adds more disruption to employers’ wage parities.  Thus, the
                                               
7 See, for example, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1966), Kahn (1995) and Card and Hyslop
(1996).  Other economic studies question the existence of downward wage rigidity and, thus, the need for
grease (McLaughlin 1994 and Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995).  Our analysis convinces us that the
negative results reflect data quality issues, not the absence of downward wage rigidity.
8 The relationship between productivity growth and inflation goals is described in Groshen and
Schweitzer (1998).  Our measure of productivity growth is the percentage change in output per hour
(reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) based on pre-chain-weighted GDP data.  Since analysts
disagree in their forecasts of future productivity growth, we choose the historical mean for this analysis:
from 1956 through 1996, the mean is 1.62 percent.9
disruptive impact of inflation may be unbounded.
9  Our estimates are consistent with those
of sand effects in retail markets (for example, see Lach and Tsiddon 1992).
Net Benefits Estimate.  Which effect dominates?  We can answer this question by
recognizing that typical personnel policies try to minimize upward or downward wage
errors equivalently, implying firms treat the costs symmetrically.
10
Since grease and sand effects apply only to the portion associated with positive
inflation rates, estimates of standard deviations must be normalized around no inflation
estimates.
11  Then, subtracting our measure of inflation’s sand disruptions from our
measure of grease benefits yields a net benefits curve (Chart 2).  Compared to the pure
grease effect in Chart 1, when we account for inflation's costs, we find that net benefits
decrease and the peak of the curve shifts closer to zero.
Strikingly, at low rates of inflation the net effect almost disappears.  At their very
highest, inflation’s net benefits amount to less than a tenth of their gross benefits at 3
percent inflation.  Indeed, the very flat net benefits curve near zero inflation suggests that
little labor market efficiency is lost from moving inflation closer to zero.  Furthermore, we
conclude that the net benefits from inflation peak at about 2.5 percent inflation, meaning
that 2.5 percent is the highest inflation rate justifiable on the basis of labor market
efficiency.
12  Thus, our results dispute some analysts’ findings that the existence of
downward wage rigidity implies that inflation should remain above 3 percent in order to
promote efficiency in the labor market.
Moreover, at inflation levels above 7 percent, the disruptive effects of inflation on
the labor market dominate the positive effects.  Indeed, our results suggest that at levels
                                               
9 If persistent higher rates of inflation led companies to index their wages to inflation, the sand
effect would level off.  However, we do not detect strong evidence of this.
10 The formal model described above provides an alternative mathematical route to
approximating net benefits from inflation that yields qualitatively similar results.  For ease of exposition,
we present this simpler formulation here.
11 We normalize our estimates around zero inflation and the average rate of productivity growth
over the sample period: 1.5%.
12 If as some analysts expect, productivity growth averages 1 percent over the next decade, then
the maximum inflation goal would rise to 3 percent.10
above 10 percent, inflation’s negative effects will mount very rapidly.  Thus, these levels
are likely to cause serious inefficiencies in the economy.
Factors that Could Alter Long-Run Inflation Goals
Despite our finding that the labor market provides little guidance on the best long-
run inflation goal, it is important for policymakers to consider how various circumstances -
- such as persistent, very low inflation, productivity growth fluctuations, and major
economic shocks -- might affect inflation goals.  We note that measures of these
conditions are extremely imprecise and are available to policymakers only after long lags,
so these circumstances would be difficult to identify as they occur.  Nevertheless, in
principle, they could justify adjusting inflation goals.
Persistent, Very Low Inflation.  All estimates of the effects of inflation (including
our own) assume that firms’ wage-setting practices and compensation schemes do not
evolve in response to an inflationary environment.  The implicit assumption that such
changes do not occur is the unavoidable result of limiting our analysis to the recent past,
during which time inflation was not below 3 percent for any long period.
13  Estimates for
very low inflation rates are produced by projecting findings over lower rates than were
observed.  Although this is a reasonable strategy (and the only one available for now),
policy makers should be aware that current research cannot fully rule out better, or worse,
outcomes under low inflation than our extrapolations suggest.
Why might these outcomes be better?  Reinforcing the conclusion that low
inflation may not harm the labor market is the argument that persistent inflation below 3
percent could relax wage rigidity -- lowering optimal inflation even closer to zero.  In a
low-inflation environment, competition would pressure participants to accept more flexible
practices to allow for pay reductions.  Examples of such innovations already exist and
would proliferate: bonus and incentive pay and contingent contracts, to name a few.
Widespread use of such pay schemes would reduce the need for grease, so inflation would
                                               
13 Our study, unlike others, has the advantage of including the low-inflation 1950s, 1960s, and
early 1990s, giving us more precise measures of the effects of low inflation.11
be less helpful than before.  Indeed, preliminary evidence from our data suggests that
occupational wage flexibility has been higher in the low-inflation 1990s than would have
been expected under historical relationships (Groshen and Schweitzer 1997).
Productivity Growth Fluctuations.  Productivity growth constitutes a key con-
sideration in choosing inflation goals because it also injects grease and sand into wage-
setting, meaning that inflation’s effects are added to those already in place.
Because general productivity growth is most likely even harder to gauge than
inflation, it adds confusion (sand) in the first stage of wage setting.  Also, because
productivity growth raises dollar wages, it adds grease in the second stage of wage setting
the same way as inflation does.  To demonstrate this, we will suppose that the growth of
trade allowed firms to operate on a larger scale, where average costs are lower and
productivity is higher.  As firms saw their sales rise and costs drop, they would add
workers.  Wages would then be bid up by the competition for workers and firms would be
willing to pay these higher wages because labor hours were more productive than before.
General productivity increases, therefore, act like inflation to raise dollar wage levels.
14
Now, imagine that productivity stopped growing -- or fell -- as has happened
occasionally.  For example, a large oil price shock spurred so much reorganization that
output stopped growing or fell for a while.  Since general productivity growth is
inflation’s main alternative for easing wage rigidity, inflation would then provide all the
grease in the labor market.  Stagnant growth, therefore, could justify raising inflation goals
to compensate for the economy’s temporary shortage of grease.
Thus, productivity growth produces grease and sand effects.  Hence, even though
productivity growth is not a monetary policy instrument or target, it is a factor to consider
in setting inflation goals.  In particular, as productivity growth strengthens, the amount of
grease and sand in the labor market becomes greater, which reduces the benefit to adding
                                               
14 Unlike inflationary wage hikes, productivity-induced wage increases are not eroded by
corresponding increases in prices.12
more inflation.  Conversely, as productivity growth becomes lower, the amount of grease
and sand in the labor market also becomes lower, increasing the net benefit of inflation.
Major Shocks to Occupational Markets.  Imagine that a massive, abrupt market
shock affected occupations differentially.  For example, say a hike in imported oil prices
jacked up wages and the need for workers in occupations involved in providing domestic
energy, simultaneously reducing opportunities and wages for occupations in energy-
intensive industries.  Under those circumstances, unemployment would be minimized if
wages could change more dramatically than normal: that is, enough to avert layoffs in
shrinking jobs and draw workers rapidly into expanding ones.  Until the adjustments are
complete, the net benefits of inflation would be higher than normal and peak at a higher
level.  Thus, in the aftermath of shocks, allowing higher inflation would mitigate some of
the pain (such as unemployment) of adjustment.
Conclusion:  Tobin and Friedman are Both Right
Unfortunately for those who prefer simplicity, this paper shows how inflation
causes both grease and sand effects in the labor market.  We describe both the institutional
mechanisms and a formal labor market model that incorporate and accommodate both
effects simultaneously.  Using these to direct empirical tests of the two effects, we detect
clear evidence of both grease and sand effects of inflation.
From a policy standpoint, our investigation of long-run inflation goal options in
detailed wage data finds that low inflation rates (below 4 percent) are unlikely to impair
labor market efficiency and raise unemployment.  When productivity growth is low, we
find that inflation does have beneficial grease effects -- that is, it helps the economy adjust
more rapidly to ongoing changes in the supply or demand for groups of workers.
However, inflation also imposes offsetting costs, as it can mislead employers and other
market participants about true prices.  When we incorporate these costly sand effects into
our analysis, we see that the measured net benefits of inflation fall markedly, making
inflation goals of higher than 2.5 percent unjustifiable on the basis of labor market
considerations.  Thus, we conclude that the labor market provides minimal guidance on
what would be the best low inflation goal.13
Since the labor market is the focus of most public worry about ill-effects from low
inflation, our results should alleviate concern about the risks of maintaining the present
low rates of inflation.  Indeed, our results are fully consistent with the recent performance
of U.S. unemployment, which shows no signs of having been aggravated by three years of
inflation rates in the neighborhood of 2.5 percent.
Unfortunately, when we ask, how low should inflation go? our results are less
conclusive.  That is, they suggest that the choice of a long-run inflation target will likely
ultimately rely on evidence of inflation’s impacts in arenas beyond the labor market.14
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Source:  Authors’ calculations using the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey.  For details, see Groshen and
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Chart 2
 Net Impact of Inflation on the Labor Market
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